The Custer fight demonstrated most of the themes of Indian warfare but also had unique features. Provoked by treaty violations and angered by effirts to confine them to reservations, large numbers of reservation Sioux had joined the so-called "hunting bands" of Sitting Bull, which had never been on a reservation. In 1876 [Phillip H.] Sheridan planned an expedition of three converging columns to force all of the Sious onto their reservation. Commanding more than 1,000 troops and 262 Crow and Shoshone allies, George Crook marched north from Fort Fetterman. John Gibbon with 450 soldiers and 25 Crow auxiliaries moved east from Forts Shaw and Ellis. Westward from Fort Abraham Lincoln came Alfred H. terry leading 925 soldiers, including the 7th Cavalry, and 40 Arikara scouts. The commanders directed their attention to catching the enemy, giving little thought to defeating him, since each column could deal with 500 to 800 warriors, more than anyone expected to fight in any single encounter. However, the Indians were concentrated in unprecedented numbers, perhaps 1,000 lodges (wigwams) in all, which meant about 2,000 warriors. They had no intention of fleeing, and many carried repeaters. They attacked Crook's column on June 17 at the Battle of the Rosebud, where fighting rafed for six hours, with Crook's Indian allies repeatedly saving his position from being overrun. The battle badly mailed Crook's command and forced it to retreat.
Unaware of the Indiands uncommon determination and of Crook's repulse, Gibbon, Terry, and Custer planned to trap the Indians in the Little Bighorn Vallet. Custer would ascend the Rosebud, cross to the Little Bighorn, and descend it. Gibbon and Terry would go up the Bighorn river and assume a blocking position at the Little Bighorn's mouth, bottling up the enemy. As soon as either force encountered Indians, it should give battle to prevent them from escaping. Custer declined to take a Gatling gun platoon, which would limit his mobility, and refused 2nd Cavalry reinforcements, believing that he could "whip all the Indians on the Continent with the Seventh Cavalry."
Approaching the Little Bighorn o June 25, the day before Gibbon and Terry could be in position, Custer fragmented his regiment. he sent Captain Frederick W. Benteen off to the south to ensure the Indians did not flee in that direction. Locating a village, he ordered Major Marcus A. Reno to charge it immediately, perhaps assuming the Indians were surprised. Custer moved to the north, and one company stayed to the rear with the pack train. But instead of running, the Indians attacked, forcing Reno to withdraw and dig in and wiping out Custer's command. Reinforced by Benteen and the pack train, Reno held out until the Gibbon-Terry column arrived on the 27th.
- For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America by Allan R. Miller & Peter Maslowski pages 255 - 256
The good folks at The Edge of the American West inform us that there is a new book out concerning the battle. It's not a straight history and was, in fact, written by a professor of English at Emory University - Michael Elliot.
...he sets his sites on the people who have studied Custer, individuals for whom, in many instances, the Little Bighorn is an ongoing concern. Elliot hits the predictable targets (reenactors, Park Service personnel, history buffs) and all the hot spots (Custer’s hometown, the Crazy Horse memorial, the battlefield itself). But he’s at his very best when he ventures into Indian country, where he considers the meaning of Long Hair and the Battle of the Greasy Grass for the Native people — and their descendants — who fought with Custer and those who killed him. Elliot’s portrait of Crow and Northern Cheyenne country, its people, and their simmering conflicts over history and cultural sovereignty is remarkable.
Sounds like another book to add to my ever growing list of "Need to read" titles.
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